Appendix 1: The Qur’an as GOD’s Speech (2)

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Due to the pressure of debate with questioners within and outside Islam, however, theologians have resorted to reasoned explanation of the connection between GOD and man. As a result, and perhaps inevitably, they have fallen into the habit of referring to what He calls His Names as ‘attributes’. The word ‘attribute’ as a noun is not found in the Qur’an, but only as a verb, and almost always with a clearly negative connotation. The shift in theological discourse from ‘Names’ to ‘Attributes’ is a significant one, as we shall see. It reflects a desire or need to reproduce in our hitherto unitary image of GOD the multiplicity of our concepts and understandings. He mentions His Face, His Eyes, His Hands, and even His Shin, but the noun “attribute” and similar terms preferred by theologians are absent.

By referring only to His Names as descriptors of His identity, AL-LAH seems to have set a limit on how we can discuss in detail Who He is, what He possesses, and how He acts. We address Him and talk about Him according to our cursory understandings, based on the diversity of our experiences and concepts, with the Qur’an revealed as a guide to what our terms and referents should be. If He considered ‘attributes’, ‘qualities’, or ‘characteristics’ to be necessary for this discourse, He would certainly have shown us how to go about using them. But this particular gate was closed until Muslim theologians opened it.

I believe that the careless reification of ‘attributes’ as the term appears in Islamic texts is a step too far, with unfortunate consequences for our conception of the pure, ineffable Unicity of GOD. My own use of ‘qualities’, ‘character’, or ‘nature’ in this book is a reluctant concession to how we normally think and speak when GOD’s attributes (sifat) are meant, but without admitting the metaphysical baggage that sifat has acquired, namely as actual entities adhering or superadded to Him. (In the same way, in Chapter 7, I refer to “good”, which would otherwise be considered to be a ‘real’ attribute of GOD, as a quale – uncreated because it is not a ‘thing’ at all, but rather an adjective signifying ‘GOD-like’ and metaphorically attributed to ‘goods’.)

We describe GOD by Himself, by what He has, and by what He does. None of these three modes actually defines Him, but is more like a reflection of ourselves and our understanding of how to be a person. His Names are tokens of these modes, such as being High (Al-‘Ali), having Knowledge (Al-‘Alim), or causing death (Al-Mumit). There is nothing categorical about these modes, nor are His Names particularly systematic. They are simply the linguistic way-stations He knows we need in our journey towards a lively, loving, and memorable relationship with Him. We could use nouns, such as Forgiveness and Knowledge, and call them His attributes, but there is no metaphysical necessity to do so, since we could also rephrase such descriptions as adjectives and call Him Forgiving and Knowing, or employ verbs and say that He forgives us and knows us.

Most of His Names in Arabic are, grammatically speaking, both nouns and adjectives, one of the exceptions being His ‘Proper’ Name, “AL-LAH”, for which there is no corresponding adjective. If we were to turn linguistics into metaphysics, we could say that “AL-LAH” is the Greatest Noun, ruling over His other Names as a noun does over adjectives, and acting in this world by verbs.

In pondering the wisdom (and beauty) of using names, rather than attributes, I remember that old saying I heard as a child: ‘Sticks and stones may break my bones but names will never hurt me.’ In other words, the names you call me do not affect who I essentially am. Attributes, on the other hand, are not just what you call me, but claim to be what I actually have. Rather than accepting their distance from reality, as conventional markers that need not be entirely accurate or complete, attributes seek to burrow down into their referent, suggesting that what they describe is distinctively, undeniably ‘there’ to some degree.

Besides the unrestricted use of the term ‘attribute’ to posit some divine entity, another unfortunate innovation in kalam, or Islamic scholastic theology, is the concept of dhat, or essence. Once again, the word does not appear with this particular meaning in the Qur’an, nor was it used by the Prophet (God’s blessings and peace be upon him) or his companions, but began to be utilized as Muslims encountered Greek philosophy and the arguments that arose therefrom. GOD’s essence, i.e. His Unitary Being, came to be contrasted with His attributes, generating more confusion.

Islamic discussions of essence (or substance) and attributes are the outcome of Muslims’ encounters with Greco-Christian theology, which had become expert in grappling with questions surrounding the conessentiality or consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. The core of such issues is where to draw the line between what is attributed to God, and is therefore eternal, and what is attributed to the created world, and is therefore temporal. In Christianity these debates were focused on the person of Jesus (‘Isa, on whom be peace) and to what extent he was human and/or divine. The Qur’an is emphatic in assigning him a created status like that of other humans –

– while naming him as His Word and a spirit from Him:

These names – Messiah, Messenger of GOD, Word of GOD, and Spirit from GOD – are honorifics that elevate ‘Isa (peace be upon him) without erasing his basic status as a created being, spoken into existence like all creatures, and infused with GOD’s Spirit like all humans. The fierce controversies that were taking place in Christianity concerning the single or dual nature of Jesus are peremptorily dismissed. The various titles bestowed on him are not allowed to either render him divine or obscure the fundamental Unicity of AL-LAH.

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